The effects of country and firm-level governance on cash management by Seifert, Bruce & Gonenc, Halit
 
 
 University of Groningen
The effects of country and firm-level governance on cash management
Seifert, Bruce; Gonenc, Halit
Published in:
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money
DOI:
10.1016/j.intfin.2017.12.001
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Final author's version (accepted by publisher, after peer review)
Publication date:
2018
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Seifert, B., & Gonenc, H. (2018). The effects of country and firm-level governance on cash management.
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money, 52, 1-16.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2017.12.001
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the




The Effects of Country and Firm-Level Governance  







Bruce Seifert  
 
Department of Finance 
Strome College of Business 
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Va. 23529 







Department of Economics, Econometrics and Finance 
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen 
 Nettelbosje 2, 9747 AE Groningen, The Netherlands 










We would like to thank the editor Jonathan A. Batten, the subject editor Duc Khuong Nguyen, an 
anonymous referee, co-chairs (Sabri Boubaker, Douglas Cumming, Duc Khuong Nguyen) and 
participants of 2016 Paris Financial Management conference, and participants at the AIB conference 
in New Orleans, the FMA European conference in Helsinki and the EFMA annual conference in 
Basel, Ettore Croci, Wolfgang Drobetz, Luminita Enache, J. W. Goodell, and Omrane Guedhami for 








The Effects of Country and Firm-Level Governance  
On Cash Management 
 
Abstract 
We examine the effects of both country and firm-level governance on cash holdings and the 
value of cash for a large international sample during the period 2002–2013. We find that both 
strong country and strong firm-level governance reduce the amount of cash holdings. We 
observe that a number of the components of both firm and country-level governance are 
significantly related to the decrease in cash holdings. We show that the value of cash 
increases as a result of good country-level governance and we provide mixed evidence that 
good firm-level governance also increases the value of cash. Our analysis also confirms that 
the payment of dividends adds to the value of cash. 
 
Keywords: cash holdings; value of cash; corporate governance; country governance;  
dividend policy; firm value 
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1. Introduction  
  Cash management is an important task for corporate executives. Too much cash can 
result in firms earning too low a return on these assets compared to more productive assets. In 
addition, executives can use the excess cash to purchase perks, can invest in projects that offer 
low expected returns to their shareholders, or can tunnel corporate money to themselves. Too 
little cash, on the other hand, can cause managers to miss out on valuable investment 
opportunities because at the time these funds are needed, the cost of these funds may be very 
expensive or unavailable. The amount of funds tied up in cash or its equivalent is quite large. 
In our study the mean cash ratio (cash and short-term investments to the net book value of 
total assets) is 18.6 percent during the period 2002-2013 for our large sample of international 
firms.  
Since Opler et al. (1999), prior research has been largely devoted to the determinants 
of cash holdings. In their study of U.S. firms, Opler et al. found support for a static tradeoff 
model to explain cash levels. Dittmar et al. (2003) observe that shareholder protection is an 
important determinant of cash holdings for an international sample of firms. Since these 
studies, researchers have examined a wide variety of determinants of cash holdings. For 
example, Gao et al. (2013) highlight the differences in cash policies between public and 
private firms. Chen et al. (2017) demonstrate the importance of debt capacity in determining 
cash levels. 
Other researchers have explored the valuation consequences of governance. Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that value of cash is substantially higher in firms that have 
good corporate governance as compared to those with poor corporate governance (see also 
Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). Pinkowitz et al. (2006) demonstrate the importance of dividends in 
cash valuation in countries that have poor investor protection. Attig et al. (2013) show the 
importance of multiple large shareholders in cash valuation. 
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The purpose of our research is to first examine the influence of both country and firm-
level governance on cash levels. Our measure of country-level governance is a broad one that 
encompasses many of the attributes that a country with good governance would be expected 
to have. We explicitly control for shareholder rights (protection of minority shareholders) in 
our empirical tests so that we can examine if there is an impact from country-level governance 
on cash holdings over and above the influence from shareholders rights. Our second inquiry 
concerns how country and firm-level governance affect the value of cash/firm1. If either or 
both firm and country governance mechanisms are effective in reducing the amount of cash 
managers hold and if managers are prone to waste cash resources, then it might be expected 
that a dollar of cash would be valued more under strong governance and that the value of the 
firm would be increased relative to weak governance.  
We investigate the effects of corporate and country governance proxies on the level of 
cash and the value of cash for a large international sample of firms from 42 countries for the 
period 2002–2013. We find that cash holdings are negatively influenced by both country and 
firm-level governance, as well, as the components of these indices. Our results show that a 
broad measure of country-level governance impacts on the level of cash holdings after 
controlling for the influence of shareholder rights. Our second set of findings concerns 
governance and the value of cash holdings. We find strong evidence that country-level 
governance increases the value of cash. The evidence concerning firm-level governance is not 
as clear. The OLS regressions do not indicate a significant positive relationship between firm-
level governance and the value of cash. However, after controlling for endogeneity between 
firm governance and firm performance we do observe a significant positive association. We 
also find that the payment of dividends results in an increase in the value of cash.  
                                                          
1 Ceteris paribus, an increase in the value of cash should cause an increase in the value of the firm. While a one 
dollar increase in cash, all things being equal, does not translate into a one dollar increase in firm value, it will 
translate into an increase in value.  
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Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that it is both good firm as well as 
good country-level governance that contribute to reducing cash balances. Previous research 
has found a variety of relationships between both forms of governance and cash levels. We 
also demonstrate that good country-level governance is more than just protection of 
shareholder rights. Our findings concerning cash valuation indicate that both country (strong 
support) and firm-level governance (mixed support) are important in improving cash 
valuation.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We give a brief review of the literature on 
agency issues, cash holdings, and cash valuation and also present our hypotheses in Section 2. 
In Section 3 we discuss our data and methodology. Section 4 contains our results and we 
present conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. Brief review of the literature and Hypothesis  
2.1. Cash holdings with an emphasis on agency issues/governance 
 There are studies that show little or no effect of agency issues on cash holdings. 
Harford (1999) and Opler et al. (1999) observe no significant association between cash 
holdings and firm-level corporate governance. Using an international sample of firms, 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) find only weak evidence to support the link between firms with 
agency issues and high levels of cash holdings2. 
 On the other hand, research has sometimes found a significant link between agency 
problems and cash holdings. Using an international sample of firms, Dittmar et al. (2003) 
show that firms located in low shareholder protection countries hold up to twice the amount of 
cash than firms residing in high shareholder protection countries. The authors argue that 
                                                          
2 Mikkelson and Partch (2003) question the implicit assumption that too much cash leads to lower operating 
performance. They observe that the operating performance of firms that previously held a lot of cash was the 
same or better than firms matched by size and industry that held less cash. One benefit of having a lot of cash is 
that it reduces the underinvestment problem.  
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shareholders in low protection countries cannot force executives to dispense the extra cash. 
Nikolov and Whited (2014) also find support for the positive association between agency 
issues and cash holdings. Using samples of both private and public firms, Gao et al. (2013) 
show the importance of agency issues on cash levels. On the other hand, Harford et al. (2008) 
find that poor governance firms hold less cash than firms with better firm governance for a 
sample of U.S. companies. The poorly governed U.S. firms tend to spend excess cash on 
capital expenditures and acquisitions rather than retain it.  
Some studies examine the effects of both country and firm-level governance on cash 
holdings. Ammann et al. (2011) find that it is firm–level governance and not country-level 
governance that is important in explaining the negative relationship between governance and 
cash holdings. On the other hand, Doidge et al. (2007) stress the importance of country 
characteristics. They show that country characteristics account for a large percentage of firm-
level corporate governance variation. In a very recent study, Chen et al. (2017) show that 
country-level shareholder protection affects the relationship between state ownership, which 
would indicate a weaker firm-level governance, and both the level and value of cash holdings 
in newly privatized firms from 58 countries.  
 In summary, the evidence is far from conclusive as to the importance of agency issues 
on cash balances. Furthermore, even if we accept the view that agency issues are a primary 
driver determining cash holdings, is the driver primarily country or firm-level governance? 
There is support for both views.  
 
2.2. Valuation of cash and governance 
 Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that better firm governance (measured by anti-
takeover defenses and shareholder monitoring) has a positive effect on the value of excess 
cash and the value of total cash. The value of cash is approximately double in well governed 
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firms as compared to poorer governed firms (see also Pinkowitz et al., 2006). Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith also find that poorly governed firms spend cash more quickly which lowers 
operating performance. They also conjecture that poorly governed firms may invest in more 
low return projects and also may be less vigilant in regards to controlling costs. Gompers et 
al. (2003), Cremers and Nair (2005) and Durnev and Kim (2005) also find a positive 
relationship between governance and firm value. 
 Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) analyze the relationship between governance and the 
valuation of cash. They look at firm-level corporate governance and subtract the corporate 
governance practices that all firms do in a country to get measures of firm and country-level 
corporate governance. They observe that it is firms’ improvements over country norms that 
matter for cash valuation, and not country norms. Ammann et al. (2011) also find a positive 
relationship between firm-level governance and firm valuation. 
 A number of studies have shown that the payment of dividends increases the value of 
cash, especially in countries with low investor protection (e.g., Pinkowitz et al., 2006)3. 
Paying a dividend may suggest that firms are mindful of not wasting excess cash and also 
reduces the amount of cash that could be used for private benefits. 
 In summary, research shows that governance affects the value of cash and hence the 
value of the firm. Whether it is country governance, firm governance or both that influence 
valuation is still unclear.  
 
2.3. Hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis is that both good country and firm-level governance variables 
should negatively affect cash holdings. Managers who are not maximizing shareholder wealth 
                                                          
3 See Renneboog and Szilagyi (2015) for a discussion of the role of dividends in the Netherlands, a country with 
low shareholder protection. They find that dividend payouts are low, a fact they attribute to the use of anti- 




should have a tendency to prefer more cash holdings to less cash holdings. Cash is probably 
the easiest asset to convert into private benefits (Myers and Rajan, 1998) and having more 
cash available makes it easier to convert it into private benefits when the time is right. In other 
words, having excess cash gives these managers the flexibility to spend money on perks or 
low return projects when they wish. Furthermore, the more cash that is available, the less 
often managers need to go to the financial markets, and hence they can avoid the required 
scrutiny to obtain cash.  
Good governance should reduce average cash holdings. Good governance will 
discipline mangers to spend wisely and encourage them to distribute excess cash to 
stockholders via dividends. Managers in these firms will not want to have too much cash 
earning relatively low returns when it can be earning higher expected returns in more 
productive assets.  
Governance appears to be multidimensional and appears to be a function of both the 
country environment (laws protecting minority shareholders and the enforcement of those 
laws) as well as the actions employed by the firm. The total effect of the governance of a firm 
should be a function of both its country and firm governance. For example, poor firm 
governance will subtract from good country governance and vice versa. Our first hypothesis 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Good country and good firm-level governance will both negatively affect 
corporate cash holdings.  
On the other hand, in theory, there are many other possible relationships between firm 
and country-level governance and cash holdings. It is possible that there is no relationship 
between either type of governance and cash holdings or that only one form of governance 




 Our second hypothesis involves the determinants of the value of cash and hence the 
value of the firm. Following Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and Gompers et al. (2003), both good 
firm-level and country-level governance will impact positively the value of cash. Good 
governance should reduce any misallocation of funds. Not only will funds be more likely 
returned to stockholders but the chances that funds will be used for perks or for other private 
benefits should be greatly reduced under good governance. Furthermore good governance 
should reduce the cost of funds as monitoring and auditing costs should be reduced. 
Additionally good governance should result in more funds being available as lenders and 
shareholders would believe that it is more likely they will be repaid. 
 Good governance does come with added direct and indirect costs to implement better 
governance (Aggarwal et al., 2009, Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009 and Bruno and 
Claessens, 2010). There are costs associated with increased disclosure, for example. Better 
governance should also reduce the private benefits to the controlling shareholders. However, 
in general, these added costs should be relatively little compared to the benefits. Thus, our 
second hypothesis follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Both good country and good firm-level governance will positively interact with 
the value of cash. 
 Like the previous hypothesis, there are many other alternatives. One possibility is that 
the value of cash may not be positively affected by either form of governance. By considering 
the fact that country-level law and regulations dictate the firm-level governance, Aggarwal et 
al. (2009) show that country-level investor protection plays a crucial role in determining the 
intensity of firm-level governance.4  
                                                          
4 For instance, Kim et al. (2015) find that the role of the monitoring function of active block investors is more 
effective in countries with stronger investor protection.  
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We also investigate one other issue. We examine the effect of the payment of 
dividends on the value of cash. There does not appear to be much controversy about the 
positive effect of dividends on cash valuation.  
 
 
4. Data description, data sources, and models 
4.1. Data 
We investigate the effects of both firm-level and country-level governance variables 
on cash management for a large international sample of firms for the period 2002–2013. The 
firm-level accounting and financial data are collected from the Worldscope database provided 
by Thomson Reuters. Utilities and financial firms are excluded from the analysis due to 
possible regulatory influences. We winsorize our financial variables at the 1% and 99% 
levels.  
Our measure of country governance is obtained from the World Bank. 
COUNTRY_GVSCORE is a broad measure and encompasses six dimensions: (1) voice and 
accountability, (2) political stability and absence of violence, (3) government effectiveness, 
(4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2009; 
6). We define the score for a particular country for a specific year as the average score of 
these six dimensions. This measure of country governance contains many attributes that 
should foster an environment conducive to good country governance. 
 Our firm governance variable, FIRM_GVSCORE, is from the ASSET4 
Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) database, which carries historical 
data for several key performance indicators on four pillars: economy, environment, social, and 
corporate governance. FIRM_GVSCORE is a corporate governance score for each firm for a 
particular year based on five categories: (1) Functions of the Board of Directors, (2) Structure 
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of the Board of Directors, (3) Compensation Policy of the Board of Directors, (4) Company 
Vision and Strategy, and (5) Shareholder Rights. No environmental and social information is 
included in our score for our corporate governance measure. 
 Our primary shareholder rights variable is the revised anti-director rights index 
(Djankov et al., 2008). This index classifies countries by their protection of minority 
shareholders. The index covers six areas: “(1) vote by mail; (2) obstacles to the actual 
exercise of the right to vote (i.e., the requirement that shares be deposited before the 
shareholders’ meeting); (3) minority representation on the board of directors through 
cumulative voting or proportional representation; (4) an oppressed minority mechanism to 
seek redress in case of expropriation; (5) preemptive rights to subscribe to new securities 
issued by the company; and (6) the right to call a special shareholder meeting.” (Djankov et 
al., 2008 pages 453-454). As a secondary measure of shareholder rights, we use the anti-self-
dealing index (Djankov et al., 2008). The index addresses the protection of minority 
shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders.  
 We gathered an initial sample consisting of 147,234 observations (24,758 firms) from 
51 countries from Thompson Reuters’ DataStream for the period 2002-2013. This sample 
does not include any financial firms or utilities. All these firms had complete (see below) 
accounting and financial data. A second sample of 25,135 observations (4,378 firms) was 
extracted from Asset4 in DataStream that had firm-level corporate governance scores during 
the same period. After merging the two samples, our final sample is composed of 17,503 
observations (2914 firms) from 42 countries. Appendix 1 reports by country the number of 
observations and firms in our initial sample as well as those in the final sample. It shows that 
while the number of observations in the final sample is much smaller than those in the initial 
sample, the firms in the final sample represent the largest (by market capitalization in 2013) 




4.2.1. Cash holdings 
 Our cash holdings equation is as follows: 
CASH RATIOit = b0 + b1 COUNTRY_GVSCOREjt + b2 FIRM_GVSCOREit + b3 ANTI-
DIRECTOR RIGHTSj + b4 SALES_GROWTHit + b5 SIZEit + b6 NWCit + b74R&Dit  
+ b8 LEVERAGEit + b9 CASH_FLOWit + b10 CAPEXPit + b11 PAYER_DUMMYit  
+ b12 ACQUISTIONSit+ b13 CLOSELY HELD SHARESit  
+ b14 CASH FLOW VOLATILITYit + b15 PRIVATE CREDIT (%GDP)jt  
+ ∑t + Ҡj + ei           (1) 
Where CASH RATIOit is the ratio of cash and short-term investments to the book value of net 
total assets for firm i at time t where net total assets are total book assets minus cash and 
short-term investments5, COUNTRY_GVSCOREjt is a measure of country governance for 
country j at time t, FIRM_GVSCOREit is a measure of firm governance for firm i at time t, 
ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTSj is the score for the anti-director rights index for country j, 
SALES_GROWTHit is the percentage change in sales for firm i from time t-1 to time t, SIZEit 
is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets in U.S. dollars for firm i at time t, NWCit is 
net working capital and is the ratio of current assets minus cash minus current liabilities to the 
book value of total assets for firm i at time t, R&Dit is the ratio of research and development 
expenses to the book value of total assets for firm i for time t6, LEVERAGEit is the ratio of the 
sum of long-term and short-term debt to the book value of total assets for firm i at time t, 
CASH_FLOWit is cash flow and equals the ratio of the sum of net income and depreciation to 
the book value of total assets for firm i at time t, CAPEXPit is the ratio of capital expenditures 
to the book value of total assets for firm i at time t, PAYER_DUMMYit is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if firm i pays a dividend at time t, ACQUISITIONSit is the ratio of net 
                                                          
5 We also use the natural log of the cash ratio in our empirical tests. 
6 If the value for R&D is missing, the value is set equal to zero 
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acquisitions to the book value of total assets for firm i at time t, CLOSELY HELD SHARESit 
is the ratio of shares held by insiders and individuals holding more than five percent of the 
stock to the total number of shares outstanding for firm i at time t, CASH FLOW 
VOLATILITYit is the standard deviation of cash flows for the previous three years for firm i 
at time t, PRIVATE CREDIT (%GDP)jt is the ratio of private credit by money banks and 
other financial institutions to GDP for country j at time t, ∑t is a set of yearly dummies, and Ҡj 
is a set of industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. 
 The dependent variable, CASH RATIO, is the ratio of cash and short-term 
investments to net assets. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) use the same variable in their analysis. 
We also report an alternative cash holdings variable, namely the natural log of the CASH 
RATIO. Dittmar et al. (2003) employ this variable in their study. 
 In equation 1, we control for a number of factors. Like Opler et al. (1999), we control 
for firm size, net working capital, R&D, leverage, cash flow, capital expenditures, and 
whether a firm pays a dividend. Larger firms should have greater access to capital markets 
and thus should not need to stockpile cash and therefore can have lower cash balances. Net 
working capital can be regarded as a substitute for cash and hence should have a negative 
influence on cash holdings. R&D is a risky activity and firms are more likely to hold more 
cash to support this activity. Leverage should have a negative impact on cash holdings as 
interest payments to support the debt will reduce cash holdings. Cash flow will add to cash 
and thus have a positive influence on cash holdings. Capital expenditures, ceteris paribus, 
should reduce cash balances as they represent a cash outlay. If a firm pays a dividend, it will 
reduce the amount of cash holdings.  
Harford et al. (2008) employ many of the same variables that Opler et al. (1999) use in 
their cash equation and in addition controls for firm cash volatility and acquisitions. Cash 
flow variability should increase the need for cash holdings as cash shortages become more 
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likely and firms try to avoid that possibility. Like capital expenditures, acquisitions represent 
a use of funds and thus should reduce cash holdings. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) control for 
sales growth, arguing it is a measure of both current and future performance and should have 
a positive influence on cash holdings. These authors also examine the impact of managerial 
ownership on cash holdings. While we do not have access to their data, we employ a similar 
variable to measure ownership, CLOSELY HELD SHARES. To the extent that ownership 
(closely held shares) reflects alignment (as opposed to entrenchment) between executives and 
shareholders, one would expect a negative relationship between closely held shares and cash 
holdings. On the other hand, if this variable is more indicative of entrenchment, then we 
might expect a positive association. Dittmar et al. (2003) control for two other variables, 
private credit as a percent of GDP and shareholder rights. We follow their lead. High levels of 
private credit should have a negative influence on cash holdings as it may indicate that firms 
can easily find credit when they need it and thus do not have to stockpile credit. Dittmar et al. 
(2003) also show that greater shareholder rights negatively impacts cash holdings as managers 
in firms in countries with low shareholder rights have significantly more cash than firms with 
operating in high shareholder rights countries. Stockholders in low shareholder rights 
countries seem unable to force managers to reduce their cash. Our primary coefficients of 
interest are b1 and b2. 
 
4.2.2. Governance and firm valuation  
 We use a two equation system to examine the effect of governance (country and firm) 
on firm valuation. The first equation in both approaches is the standard equation employed by 
Fama and French (1998) and used, for example, by Pinkowitz et al. (2006) for firm valuation 
with a couple of modifications necessary to test our hypotheses and the second equation 
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explains the determinants of firm governance7,8. We also use a two equation system because 
the direction of causation between firm governance and firm performance is not clear 
(Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). We have previously hypothesized that good governance 
should positively influence firm valuation. It is also possible to argue that good performance 
should lead to greater demand for capital which leads to better governance. The greater the 
need for capital the more pressure will occur to lower the cost of these funds and good 
governance can lower the cost of external capital. The two equation system follows: 
FIRM_VALUEit = b0 + b1 CASH RATIOit + b2 COUNTRY_GVSCOREit + b3 
FIRM_GVSCOREit + b4 CASH RATIOit * COUNTRY_GVSCOREit + b5 CASH RATIOit* 
FIRM_GVSCOREit + b6 ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTSj + b7 EARNINGSit + b8 dEARNINGSit 
+ b9 dEARNINGSit+1 + b10 dNET_ASSETit + b11 dNET_ASSETit+1 + b12 R&Dit + b13 dR&Dit 
+ b14 dR&Dit+1 + b15 INTERESTit + b16 dINTERESTit + b17 dINTERESTit+1 + b18 DIVIDENDit  
+ b19 dDIVIDENDit + b20 dDIVIDENDit+1 + b21 dFIRM_VALUEit+1 + ∑t + Ҡj + eit   (2) 
FIRM_GVSCOREit = b0 + b1 Sizeit + b3 LEVERAGEit + b4 CASH_FLOWit  
+ b5 EXTERNAL_FINANCEit + b6 FIRM_VALUEit + b7 CLOSELY HELD SHARESit  
+ b8 COUNTRY_GVSCOREjt + ∑t + Ҡj + eit       (3) 
Where FIRM_VALUEit is defined as the sum of the book value of total assets plus the market 
value of common equity minus book value of common equity for firm i at time t, 
EARNINGSit is earnings before interest and extraordinary items (after taxes and depreciation) 
for firm i at time t, NET_ASSETit is net assets (total assets minus cash and equivalents) for 
firm i at time t9, R&D is research and development expenses and if R&D is missing it is set 
equal to zero, INTERESTit is interest expense for firm i at time t, and DIVIDENDit is 
dividends for firm i at time t. In equation 2, dXt is the change in variable X from time t-1 to 
                                                          
7 See Aggarwal et al. (2009) for a comparison of governance practices between U.S. and foreign firms. 
8 Relatively few papers model firm governance. Durnev and Kim (2005) is an exception. 
9 Since we are testing hypotheses about the value of cash and the value of the firm, we subdivide assets into cash 
and net assets (total assets minus cash and its equivalents).  
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time t and dXt+1 is the change in variable X from time t to time t+1. The dXt+1 variables reflect 
expectations about future outcomes. All variables in equation 2 are scaled by book assets to 
control for heteroskedasticity. In equation 3 EXTERNAL_FINANCEit is the need for external 
finance for firm i at time t and it is the difference between the growth in assets and the growth 
in return on equity. See Table 1 for definitions of all variables. 
 We estimate the system of equations using 3SLS to take advantage of the correlation 
in the error terms to arrive at more efficient estimates. Both firm value and firm governance 
are designated as endogenous variables. A predictive equation is used for firm value in 
equation 3 using all the exogenous variables in the two equations, and in cases where firm 
governance is used in equation 2, a first stage regression is used to develop estimates for firm 
governance in equation 2. If firm governance is not a variable in one of our specifications for 
equation 2, then we simply estimate equation 2 using OLS. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our key variables both overall (Panel A) as 
well by country (Panel B). Panel A indicates that the mean (median) firm CASH RATIO in 
our sample is .186 (.109). Means for Switzerland, Ireland, Hong Kong and Norway10 are over 
.25 and firms in Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, New Zealand, Portugal, 
and Russia, and have means all under .11. In results not reported, the mean cash holdings (the 
ratio of cash and short-term investments to total book assets) for firms in our sample are 
smaller than the mean for all the firms in the Worldscope database for the years 2002-13 (our 
sample period). In fact, in each of the years of our sample period, the mean cash holdings of 
                                                          
10 It should be pointed out that that some countries have a very small sample size and hence statistics from these 
countries should be viewed cautiously.  
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the firms in our sample are smaller than the mean cash holdings of all the firms in the 
Worldscope database. Having a corporate governance rating is associated with lower cash 
holdings. In terms of country governance statistics, the overall governance statistic 
(COUNTRY_GVSCORE) from the World Bank range from -.728 (Russia) to 1.879 (Finland) 
with a mean of 1.234.  
We also examined whether both firm and country governance scores have improved 
over time. In unreported results11, we observe that country-level scores have generally 
decreased over time while firm governance scores have improved from 2002 to 2013.  
In terms of correlations, with one exception all of our variables in our cash holdings 
equation have a significant correlation with the CASH RATIO. In unreported results, 
SALES_GROWTH, CASH FLOW, CASH FLOW VOLATILITY, CLOSELY HELD 
SHARES, PRIVATE CREDIT (%GDP), and R&D are positively related and the rest of the 
variables are negatively related with the CASH RATIO. The one exception is 
COUNTRY_GVSCORE which has a negative but insignificant correlation. PRIVATE 
CREDIT (%GDP) has the opposite correlation than was expected and the positive correlation 
between CLOSELY HELD SHARES and the CASH RATIO may indicate that the variable 
CLOSELY HELD SHARES is more indicative of managerial entrenchment than alignment.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
5.2. Regression analysis 
5.2.1. Cash holdings 
 Table 3 presents our main findings for our cash holdings equation. We present two 
panels that use different definitions for the CASH RATIO. Panel A gives regression results 
                                                          
11 We looked at all the firms in our sample regardless of the number of years a particular firm was in the sample. 
We also studied the subset of firms that had observations for all the years of our sample. 
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using the ratio of cash and short-term investments to the book value of net assets. In Panel B 
we use the natural logarithm of the cash ratio.  
Each panel contains three regression results (1) the only governance variable is a 
country one, (2) only a firm governance variable is used, and finally (3) both a firm and 
country governance variables are employed. Our approach allows us to see whether firm and 
country governance variables individually impact cash holdings and whether one of these 
governance variables appears to explain cash holdings more than the other variable.  
Our results from both panels indicate that corporate governance, whether defined at 
the country-level or firm-level has a negative influence on the amount of cash holdings. In all 
of our OLS regressions, the coefficients on both corporate governance variables are 
significantly negative. This is true whether we look at the effects of firm-level or country 
governance separately or put both variables together in the same regression. Presumably good 
corporate governance puts a check on management from holding too much cash. In summary, 
our findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1.  
It is important to note that our results concerning the importance of corporate 
governance in reducing cash holdings occur after explicitly controlling for a shareholder 
rights variable ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS, which has a significant negative impact on cash 
holdings, indicating that strong shareholder rights is associated with smaller cash holdings. In 
unreported findings we find the same results when the anti-self-dealing index is used instead 
of the ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS variable. We also observe that our results concerning the 
importance of both firm and country governance variables in reducing cash holdings also 
occur if we eliminate the ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS from the regression equation.  
In terms of economic impact, using the coefficients from equations 1 and 2 from Panel 
A of Table 3, a one standard deviation increase in country governance (.461) is associated 
with a decrease in the CASH RATIO of .00876 (-.019 x .461) which represents a decrease of 
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about 5% of the mean value of the CASH RATIO (.186). The corresponding numbers for firm 
governance are a decrease of .01634 (-.055 x .297) which equates to a decrease of about 9%. 
The other control variables behave as expected in Panels A-B of Table 3 with two 
exceptions. R&D, cash flow volatility, sales growth, and cash flow have a positive effect on 
the amount of cash holdings. Capital expenditures, whether a firm pays a dividend, leverage, 
net working capital, size, and acquisitions have a negative effect. The two exceptions on the 
control variable are the coefficients on PRIVATE CREDIT (%GDP) and CLOSELY HELD 
SHARES. The coefficients on CLOSELY HELD SHARES are always positive but often 
insignificant. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) also found that many of their coefficients on their 
management ownership variables were also insignificant. The coefficients on PRIVATE 
CREDIT (%GDP) are significantly positive (similar to Dittmar et al. 2003) when the 
dependent variable is the CASH RATIO but not significantly positive when the dependent 
variable is the natural log of this ratio. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5.2.1.1. Components of country and firm governance  
We examine the components of both firm and country governance to see which of 
these influences the CASH RATIO. To save space, we report only in Table 4 (Panels A and 
B) the coefficients for the firm and country governance variables or their components and the 
ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS while still using all of the independent variables in equation 1 in 
the regressions. In Panel A of Table 4, we analyze the components of country governance and 
find first that all of the components have a negative impact on the CASH RATIO and that for 
four of the six components (Voice and Accountability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and 
Control of Corruption) the influence is significant. In all of the regressions in Panel A the 
coefficients for FIRM_GVSCORE and ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS remain significantly 
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negative. Overall, our results suggest that not only does the aggregate score for country-level 
governance negatively impact the CASH RATIO but so do the components.  
In terms of the components of firm-level governance (Panel B), all of the components 
of the FIRM_GVSCORE except shareholder rights have a significant negative impact on the 
CASH RATIO. It should be noted that the shareholder rights component of 
FIRM_GVSCORE and ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS variable should be positively correlated 
so getting significant coefficients on both the shareholder rights component and the ANTI-
DIRECTOR Rights could be difficult due to multicollinearity12. Our findings suggest that that 
the overall index for firm governance as well as its components have a negative relationship 
with the CASH RATIO. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
5.2.1.2. Results by changing sample composition 
It is possible that our findings are driven by firms from a particular country. As a 
result, we run four more sets of regressions, excluding firms first from the U.S., then 
excluding only companies from Japan, and excluding only firms from the U.K., and finally 
excluding all these three countries together. These are the countries with the most number of 
observations, Panel B in Table 2. Panels A and B of Table 5 display our findings with the 
dependent variable CASH RATIO and the natural logarithm of CASH RATIO, respectively. 
In both panels, the estimated coefficients for firm governance are always negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level while the estimated coefficients on country-level 
governance are always negative but only statistically significant in the samples that excludes 
firms from U.K. and the one that excludes Japanese companies when we use CASH RATIO 
as the dependent variable. In the results with the LN (CASH RATIO) in panel B, in addition 
                                                          
12 If we eliminate the variable ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS from the equation in Panel B, then the variable 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS (component of FIRM_GVSCORE) has a significant negative coefficient. 
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to the samples excluding the UK and Japan, the country level governance has a significant 
negative coefficient with excluding all three countries together.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
5.2.2. Valuation effects  
 We next examine the effect of governance on firm valuation. In particular we ask 
whether both types of governance affect the value of the firm and whether the payment of 
dividends increases the value of the firm.  
 In Table 6 we present our basic valuation regressions. In Panel A, we report the results 
of equation 2 using OLS while in Panel B we give our 3SLS findings. In the first part (firm 
value equation) of Panels A and B we report the findings of four equations, all employing the 
basic Fama and French (1998) methodology. In all of our regressions we explicitly control for 
ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS13. In the first equation we add two more variables to the Fama 
and French equation – (1) the country governance variable and (2) the interactive variable 
between country governance and cash holdings. In the second equation we replace the country 
governance variable with a firm governance variable. The third equation contains both 
governance variables and their interactions with cash. The forth equation simply adds one 
more variable to the Fama and French method, namely the interactive variable between cash 
holdings and dividend payments. For the second part of Panel B we provide the regression 
results for the firm governance equation.  
 We first examine the firm value equation in Panels A and B. We focus on the 
interactive variables (CASH*COUNTRY_GVSCORE and CASH*FIRM_GVSCORE). The 
interactive variable, CASH*COUNTRY_GVSCORE is significantly positive whether we 
estimate the equation using OLS or 3SLS. On the other hand, we find no evidence that good 
                                                          
13 Our important results do not change if we exclude this variable from our regressions. 
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firm governance increases the value of cash in OLS estimation. However, the interactive 
variable, CASH*FIRM_GVSCORE is positively associated with the firm value once we 
control the endogeneity problem with 3SLS estimation.  
 We next look at the interactive variable CASH*DIVIDENDS in Panels A and B. This 
variable is always positive and significant in Panels A and B. The payout of dividends should 
increase the value of cash since less cash is available to managers to possibly misappropriate.  
 Turning to the corporate governance equation, our main result is that the relationship 
between firm value and firm governance is positive. It may be that firms with high value may 
invest in more governance because they believe high governance may lead to additional 
sources of funds that may be critical for the firm’s long-term success. We also find that the 
need for external funding increases the level of firm governance. Presumably the more that 
firms need external funding the more they will increase their firm governance so as to reduce 
the cost of this financing. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
6. Conclusions  
 Our paper investigates the impact of agency costs and governance on cash 
management. Specifically our paper examines the role of both country and firm-level 
governance in (1) influencing cash levels and (2) the value of cash. Previous research have 
often produced conflicting results. We use a broad measure of corporate governance and 
control explicitly for shareholder rights in our empirical tests. 
 We find that both good country and firm-level governance negatively affect cash 
holdings. It is not just one form of governance that matters but both are important. Good 
country (firm) governance can be more effective when it is combined with good firm-level 
(country) governance. Presumably good governance “forces” managers to act more in 
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shareholders’ interests and one of the ways managers can do this is to limit the amount of 
money they have at their control that could potentially be used for private benefits. We also 
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Table 1: Definitions of variables 
Variables Definitions 
CASH RATIO The ratio of cash and short-term investments to book value of net total assets 
Ln(CASH RATIO) The natural logarithm of CASH RATIO 
FIRM_VALUE 
The ratio of (Book value of total assets + market value of common equity − book value 




Average of six World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI): 
1) Voice and Accountability 
2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
3) Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality  
4) Rule of Law 




Firm-level corporate governance scores from ASSET4 with following components: 
1) Board Functions 
2) Board Structure 
3) Compensation Policy 
4) Vision and Strategy 
5) Shareholder Rights 




Revised Anti-Director Rights Index (Djankov et al., 2008) with following components:  
1) vote by mail 
2) shares not blocked or deposited 
3) cumulative voting 
4) oppressed minority 
5) pre-emptive rights 




Average of ex-ante and ex-post indices created for private enforcement (private control 
of self-dealing) mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, governing a 
specific self-dealing transaction (Djankov et al., 2008) 
SALES_GROWTH Percentage change in sales from t-1 to t. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of book value of assets in USD 
NET_ASSETS Total assets - (cash + short-term investments) 
NWC 
Net Working Capital, which is the ratio of [(current assets – cash) – current liabilities] to 
book value of total assets 
R&D The ratio of Research & Development Expenditures to book value of total assets 
LEVERAGE 
The ratio of (book value of total long-term debt + short-term debt) to book value of total 
assets 
CASH_FLOW The ratio of (net income + depreciation) to book value of total assets 
CAPEXP The ratio of capital expenditures to book value of total assets 
DIVIDEND The amount of cash dividends paid 
PAYER_DUMMY Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if common dividends are paid, otherwise 0 
ACQUISITIONS The ratio of net assets from acquisitions to book value of total assets 
CLOSELY HELD SHARES Percentage of shares held by insiders and also by individuals that own 5% or more 
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY Standard deviation of CASH_FLOW over the last three years 
PRIVATE CREDIT (%GDP) Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (%) 
EXTERNAL_FINANCE The difference between growth in assets and growth in return on equity 
EARNINGS Net income excluding interest, extraordinary items and deferred income and taxes. 




Table 2: Sample statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
CASH RATIO EQUATION (N=17,503) 
 
Mean Median StdDev. 
CASH RATIO 0.186 0.109 0.218 
Ln(CASH RATIO) -2.287 -2.207 1.220 
SALES_GROWTH 0.118 0.069 0.414 
SIZE 15.411 15.340 1.406 
NWC 0.005 0.003 0.151 
R&D 0.019 0.000 0.041 
LEVERAGE 0.351 0.341 0.239 
CASH_FLOW 0.098 0.096 0.110 
CAPEXP 0.056 0.041 0.054 
PAYER_DUMMY 0.760 1.000 0.427 
ACQUISITIONS 0.021 0.001 0.050 
CLOSELY HELD SHARES 0.247 0.179 0.233 
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY 0.037 0.019 0.070 
PRIVATE CREDIT (%GDP) 1.510 1.720 0.417 
COUNTRY_GVSCORE 1.234 1.285 0.461 
FIRM_CGVSCORE 0.549 0.636 0.297 
FIRM_CGVSCORE (Board Functions) 0.544 0.628 0.299 
FIRM_CGVSCORE (Board Structure) 0.539 0.651 0.302 
FIRM_CGVSCORE (Compensation Pol.) 0.548 0.635 0.294 
FIRM_CGVSCORE (Vision and Strategy) 0.504 0.453 0.315 
FIRM_CGVSCORE (Shareholder Rights) 0.530 0.533 0.300 
FIRM_VALUE EQUATION (N=17,263) 
 Mean Median StdDev. 
FIRM_VALUE 1.893 1.461 1.763 
(EARNINGS)t 0.078 0.080 0.108 
d(EARNINGS)t 0.008 0.009 0.106 
d(EARNINGS)t+1 0.011 0.008 0.115 
d(NET_ASSETS)t 0.050 0.042 0.185 
d(NET_ASSETS)t+1 0.090 0.042 0.302 
(R&D)t 0.019 0.000 0.039 
d(R&D)t 0.000 0.000 0.011 
d(R&D)t+1 0.000 0.000 0.011 
(INTEREST)t 0.012 0.010 0.012 
d(INTEREST)t 0.000 0.000 0.007 
d(INTEREST)t+1 0.001 0.000 0.008 
(DIVIDEND)t 0.023 0.013 0.030 
d(DIVIDEND)t 0.002 0.001 0.015 
d(DIVIDEND)t+1 0.002 0.001 0.016 
d(FIRM_VALUE)t+1 0.170 0.071 1.016 
EXTERNAL_FINANCE -0.182 -0.107 0.749 
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Australia 1130 0.185 0.637 1.603 1.251 1.459 0.933 1.713 1.764 1.753 1.997 4 
Austria 90 0.178 0.339 1.599 0.926 1.413 1.190 1.759 1.548 1.864 1.819 2.5 
Belgium 115 0.104 0.482 1.329 0.596 1.383 0.832 1.669 1.307 1.341 1.442 3 
Brazil 107 0.192 0.265 0.030 0.625 0.450 -0.127 -0.094 0.110 -0.122 -0.036 5 
Canada 411 0.101 0.755 1.595 1.553 1.467 0.942 1.843 1.606 1.761 1.951 4 
Chile 51 0.096 0.081 1.184 0.966 1.069 0.474 1.249 1.490 1.332 1.488 4 
China 231 0.246 0.246 -0.538 1.195 -1.608 -0.564 0.075 -0.222 -0.395 -0.518 1 
Colombia 11 0.124 0.320 -0.308 0.438 -0.115 -1.366 0.028 0.357 -0.365 -0.389 3 
Denmark 154 0.109 0.328 1.848 1.779 1.635 1.064 2.176 1.826 1.931 2.454 4 
Finland 204 0.119 0.587 1.879 0.773 1.573 1.467 2.170 1.764 1.946 2.352 3.5 
France 568 0.154 0.520 1.223 0.877 1.256 0.515 1.531 1.211 1.428 1.400 3.5 
Germany 469 0.151 0.311 1.464 0.955 1.378 0.855 1.567 1.541 1.660 1.780 3.5 
Greece 53 0.106 0.221 0.500 0.932 0.865 0.123 0.578 0.731 0.646 0.056 2 
Hong Kong 427 0.251 0.315 1.429 1.648 0.549 0.979 1.757 1.910 1.536 1.843 5 
Hungary 13 0.103 0.486 0.705 0.581 0.844 0.689 0.668 1.015 0.708 0.303 2 
India 217 0.175 0.293 -0.312 0.470 0.419 -1.238 -0.069 -0.394 -0.058 -0.530 5 
Indonesia 76 0.220 0.214 -0.423 0.281 -0.024 -0.706 -0.223 -0.300 -0.598 -0.684 4 
Ireland 139 0.276 0.621 1.494 1.269 1.388 1.086 1.517 1.682 1.686 1.602 5 
Israel 37 0.185 0.439 0.588 0.805 0.617 -1.269 1.290 1.176 0.923 0.789 4 
Italy 186 0.130 0.411 0.599 0.788 1.007 0.474 0.491 0.911 0.460 0.249 2 
Japan 2192 0.204 0.124 1.206 1.824 1.006 0.948 1.455 1.136 1.308 1.384 4.5 
Korea, Rep. 315 0.170 0.144 0.766 0.955 0.709 0.308 1.191 0.934 0.983 0.469 4.5 
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Luxembourg 27 0.133 0.367 1.688 0.838 1.564 1.392 1.678 1.722 1.788 1.985 2 
Malaysia 97 0.232 0.406 0.316 1.058 -0.414 0.056 1.038 0.560 0.500 0.159 5 
Mexico 37 0.141 0.182 -0.154 0.247 0.101 -0.706 0.288 0.366 -0.573 -0.402 3 
Netherlands 218 0.143 0.628 1.676 1.142 1.578 0.988 1.840 1.757 1.777 2.117 2.5 
New Zealand 42 0.048 0.568 1.746 1.281 1.558 1.198 1.752 1.755 1.854 2.360 4 
Norway 60 0.282 0.469 1.690 0.848 1.603 1.252 1.946 1.343 1.926 2.071 3.5 
Peru 7 0.145 0.295 -0.228 0.264 0.069 -0.818 -0.142 0.478 -0.610 -0.344 4.5 
Philippines 25 0.188 0.200 -0.432 0.305 -0.039 -1.346 0.070 -0.133 -0.518 -0.623 4 
Poland 28 0.151 0.206 0.801 0.493 1.008 0.987 0.641 0.971 0.714 0.488 2 
Portugal 55 0.102 0.474 1.037 1.394 1.205 0.879 1.051 1.004 1.064 1.021 2.5 
Russia 98 0.092 0.274 -0.728 0.422 -0.915 -0.861 -0.401 -0.358 -0.810 -1.024 4 
Singapore 225 0.220 0.470 1.501 0.983 -0.147 1.204 2.205 1.842 1.693 2.209 5 
South Africa 234 0.126 0.624 0.236 1.452 0.575 -0.019 0.405 0.399 0.112 -0.054 5 
Spain 133 0.154 0.402 0.922 1.457 1.111 -0.094 1.171 1.151 1.117 1.075 5 
Sweden 355 0.119 0.509 1.763 1.104 1.590 1.212 1.984 1.664 1.899 2.231 3.5 
Switzerland 383 0.273 0.451 1.730 1.526 1.593 1.274 1.952 1.627 1.824 2.112 3 
Thailand 58 0.207 0.449 -0.295 1.246 -0.436 -1.283 0.224 0.222 -0.177 -0.319 4 
Turkey 46 0.206 0.211 -0.053 0.467 -0.166 -1.036 0.345 0.364 0.087 0.086 3 
United Kingdom 2217 0.143 0.716 1.419 1.661 1.361 0.367 1.647 1.725 1.678 1.737 5 
United States 5962 0.213 0.749 1.266 1.807 1.158 0.376 1.584 1.479 1.568 1.432 3 
Total 17503 0.186 0.549 1.234 1.510 1.099 0.546 1.501 1.387 1.432 1.441 3.76 
This table reports the mean, median and standard deviation of variables used in equation 1 and in equations 2 and 3 (Panel A), mean values of cash ratio and 
country level variables by country (Panel B). The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. Definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Firm and country-level governance and cash holdings 
 Panel A: 
The dependent variable: CASH RATIO 
Panel B: 
The dependent variable: Ln(CASH RATIO) 
COUNTRY_GVSCORE -0.019*** 
 
-0.013**  -0.121***  -0.086**  
 [0.006] 
 
[0.006]    [0.035]  [0.036]    
FIRM_GVSCORE 
 
-0.055*** -0.051***  -0.360*** -0.336*** 
 
 
[0.011] [0.011]     [0.062] [0.062]    
ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.024 -0.048** -0.043**  
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]    [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]    
SALES_GROWTH 0.014** 0.013** 0.013**  0.056** 0.051* 0.050*   
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]    [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]    
SIZE -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.038*** -0.028* -0.032**  
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]    [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]    
NWC -0.357*** -0.358*** -0.357*** -1.672*** -1.678*** -1.667*** 
 [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]    [0.147] [0.147] [0.147]    
R&D 1.162*** 1.168*** 1.171*** 4.781*** 4.819*** 4.837*** 
 [0.136] [0.135] [0.135]    [0.565] [0.559] [0.561]    
LEVERAGE -0.241*** -0.238*** -0.238*** -1.225*** -1.205*** -1.203*** 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]    [0.078] [0.078] [0.078]    
CFLOW 0.266*** 0.286*** 0.283*** 1.384*** 1.516*** 1.498*** 
 [0.036] [0.037] [0.037]    [0.169] [0.171] [0.172]    
CAPEXP -0.576*** -0.580*** -0.584*** -3.101*** -3.127*** -3.154*** 
 [0.053] [0.053] [0.053]    [0.359] [0.357] [0.358]    
PAYER_DUMMY -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.196*** -0.221*** -0.218*** 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007]    [0.037] [0.038] [0.038]    
ACQUISITIONS -0.433*** -0.419*** -0.416*** -2.519*** -2.428*** -2.409*** 
 [0.030] [0.029] [0.029]    [0.180] [0.179] [0.179]    
CLOSELY HELD SHARES 0.040*** 0.018 0.015 0.253*** 0.113 0.094 
  [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]    [0.074] [0.077] [0.078]    
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY 0.410*** 0.423*** 0.424*** 1.735*** 1.822*** 1.829*** 
 
[0.050] [0.051] [0.051]    [0.245] [0.250] [0.251]    
PRIVATE CREDIT(%GDP) 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.02 0.015 0.036 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]    [0.042] [0.041] [0.042]    
CONSTANT 0.487*** 0.502*** 0.515*** -1.434*** -1.335** -1.250**  
 
[0.079] [0.080] [0.082]    [0.520] [0.529] [0.543]    
Adjusted R-sq 0.377 0.38 0.38 0.319 0.323 0.324 
Observations 17503 17503 17503 17503 17503 17503 
This table reports pooled time-series cross-sectional estimates for the CASH RATIO and the natural logarithm of CASH 
RATIO. Country level governance is measured by the average of six World Bank Governance Indicators 
(COUNTRY_GVSCORE). The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors reported in brackets are clustered at the firm-level. Definitions of all variables are given in Table 1. The 
symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: The effects of components of country-level governance and firm-level governance on cash holdings 
Panel A: Components of country-level governance and cash holdings 
 













RULE OF LAW 
CONTROL OF 
CORRUPTION 
Components of COUNTRY_GVSCORE -0.021*** -0.004 -0.008 -0.013* -0.010* -0.010** 
 
[0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.004] 
FIRM_GVSCORE -0.048*** -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Adjusted R-sq 0.381 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Observations 17503 17503 17503 17503 17503 17503 
 
Panel B: Components of firm-level governance and cash holdings 
 













COUNTRY_GVSCORE -0.016*** -0.015** -0.014** -0.016*** -0.018*** 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Components of FIRM_GVSCORE -0.035*** -0.041*** -0.030*** -0.045*** -0.012 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] 
ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.010*** -0.014*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Adjusted R-sq 0.378 0.379 0.378 0.38 0.377 
Observations 17503 17503 17503 17503 17503 
This table reports pooled time-series cross-sectional estimates for CASH RATIO against six World Bank Governance Indicators (COUNTRY_GVSCORE) in Panel A and 
five different components of the firm-level governance score (FIRM_GVSCORE)  in Panel B separately. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. All regressions include all 
other control variables, which are used in Table 3 but their estimated coefficients are not reported, and year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors reported in brackets are 
clustered at the firm-level. Definitions of all variables are given in Table 1. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Robustness: Alternative sample compositions 










COUNTRY_GVSCORE -0.003 -0.015**  -0.014**  -0.009 
 [0.007]    [0.006]    [0.006]    [0.007]    
FIRM_GVSCORE -0.081*** -0.034*** -0.049*** -0.067*** 
 [0.012]    [0.012]    [0.013]    [0.016]    
ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS -0.004 -0.007*   -0.017*** 0.00 
 [0.004]    [0.004]    [0.003]    [0.004]    
SALES_GROWTH 0.00 0.014**  0.013**  -0.001 
 [0.006]    [0.006]    [0.006]    [0.006]    
SIZE -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.015*** 
 [0.003]    [0.003]    [0.003]    [0.003]    
NWC -0.316*** -0.403*** -0.359*** -0.355*** 
 [0.029]    [0.030]    [0.032]    [0.038]    
R&D 0.709*** 1.367*** 1.244*** 1.187*** 
 [0.170]    [0.127]    [0.145]    [0.248]    
LEVERAGE -0.260*** -0.251*** -0.214*** -0.249*** 
 [0.020]    [0.017]    [0.016]    [0.024]    
CFLOW 0.248*** 0.288*** 0.281*** 0.237*** 
 [0.043]    [0.040]    [0.037]    [0.050]    
CAPEXP -0.538*** -0.618*** -0.526*** -0.480*** 
 [0.061]    [0.056]    [0.053]    [0.067]    
PAYER_DUMMY -0.029*** -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.033*** 
 
[0.008]    [0.008]    [0.008]    [0.010]    
ACQUISITIONS -0.337*** -0.421*** -0.422*** -0.325*** 
 [0.036]    [0.032]    [0.029]    [0.040]    
CLOSELY HELD SHARES 0.015 0.006 0.012 -0.011 
  [0.014]    [0.013]    [0.013]    [0.016]    
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY 0.407*** 0.414*** 0.401*** 0.326*** 
 
[0.080]    [0.051]    [0.051]    [0.087]    
PRIVATE CREDIT(%GDP) 0.007 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.016 
 [0.009]    [0.007]    [0.008]    [0.012]    
CONSTANT 0.413*** 0.512*** 0.525*** 0.437*** 
 
[0.087]   [0.085]    [0.082]    [0.091]    
Adjusted R-sq 0.304 0.401 0.388 0.3 
Observations 11541 15286 15311 7132 
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COUNTRY_GVSCORE -0.06 -0.093*** -0.083**  -0.071*   
 [0.037]    [0.036]    [0.036]    [0.039]    
FIRM_GVSCORE -0.498*** -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.439*** 
 [0.073]    [0.067]    [0.077]    [0.094]    
ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS -0.014 -0.003 -0.054**  0.001 
 [0.024]    [0.023]    [0.021]    [0.026]    
SALES_GROWTH 0.007 0.065**  0.053*   0.028 
 [0.026]    [0.026]    [0.027]    [0.028]    
SIZE -0.006 -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.018 
 [0.016]    [0.015]    [0.015]    [0.020]    
NWC -1.573*** -1.697*** -1.767*** -1.687*** 
 [0.164]    [0.141]    [0.161]    [0.194]    
R&D 3.415*** 5.677*** 4.966*** 5.177*** 
 [0.741]    [0.518]    [0.611]    [0.859]    
LEVERAGE -1.258*** -1.279*** -1.065*** -1.170*** 
 [0.101]    [0.083]    [0.082]    [0.131]    
CFLOW 1.326*** 1.447*** 1.585*** 1.297*** 
 [0.216]    [0.184]    [0.177]    [0.258]    
CAPEXP -2.591*** -3.133*** -3.056*** -2.123*** 
 [0.414]    [0.359]    [0.370]    [0.429]    
PAYER_DUMMY -0.131*** -0.209*** -0.235*** -0.137**  
 
[0.046]    [0.040]    [0.039]    [0.056]    
ACQUISITIONS -1.844*** -2.436*** -2.439*** -1.755*** 
 [0.228]    [0.195]    [0.182]    [0.290]    
CLOSELY HELD SHARES 0.08 0.033 0.09 -0.068 
  [0.083]    [0.080]    [0.082]    [0.094]    
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY 1.615*** 1.723*** 1.807*** 1.183**  
 
[0.412]    [0.261]    [0.248]    [0.491]    
PRIVATE CREDIT(%GDP) 0.003 0.047 -0.003 0.02 
 [0.050]    [0.043]    [0.049]    [0.073]    
CONSTANT -1.666*** -1.341**  -1.076**  -1.604*** 
 
[0.566]    [0.553]    [0.545]    [0.596]    
Adjusted R-sq 0.252 0.349 0.318 0.234 
Observations 11541 15286 15311 7132 
This table reports pooled time-series cross-sectional estimates for the alternative proxies of cash 
holdings using alternative samples, which are created excluding three countries having the highest 
number of observations. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. All regressions include year and 
industry fixed effects. Standard errors reported in brackets are clustered at the firm-level. Definitions 
of all variables are given in Table 1. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Firm and country-level governance and the value of cash 
Panel A: OLS estimation 
The dependent variable: FIRM_VALUE 
CASH RATIOt 0.764** 1.829*** 0.819** 1.767*** 
 [0.307] [0.289] [0.353] [0.130]    
COUNTRY_GVSCOREt -0.151*** 
 
-0.166***              
 [0.042] 
 
[0.045]              
CASH RATIOt*COUNTRY_GVSCOREt 0.837***  0.868***              
 [0.225]  [0.235]              
FIRM_GVSCOREt 
 
0.028 0.078              
 
 
[0.068] [0.073]              
CASH RATIOt*FIRM_GVSCOREt 
 
0.043 -0.186              
 
 
[0.449] [0.462]              
CASH RATIOt*DIVIDENDt    1.962*   
    [1.031]    
ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS -0.042** -0.037** -0.039** -0.040**  
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017]    
EARNINGSt 1.397*** 1.346*** 1.377*** 1.339*** 
 [0.405] [0.406] [0.404] [0.405]    
dEARNINGSt 0.216 0.223 0.222 0.173 
 [0.404] [0.404] [0.403] [0.405]    
dEARNINGSt+1 1.370** 1.344** 1.366** 1.347**  
 [0.595] [0.594] [0.594] [0.593]    
dNET_ASSETSt 0.744*** 0.744*** 0.743*** 0.780*** 
 [0.101] [0.100] [0.100] [0.099]    
dNET_ASSETSt+1 0.477*** 0.487*** 0.479*** 0.494*** 
 [0.177] [0.178] [0.177] [0.176]    
R&Dt 5.408*** 5.407*** 5.419*** 5.576*** 
 [1.052] [1.099] [1.100] [1.041]    
dR&Dt -6.170** -6.272** -6.202** -6.030**  
 [2.762] [2.831] [2.820] [2.799]    
dR&Dt+1 -3.891 -3.94 -3.875 -3.843 
 [2.681] [2.651] [2.639] [2.691]    
INTERESTt 7.431*** 7.284*** 7.183*** 7.101*** 
 
[1.595] [1.690] [1.703] [1.642]    
dINTERESTt -11.029*** -11.050*** -10.931*** -10.720*** 
 
[3.969] [3.999] [3.982] [4.003]    
dINTERESTt+1 -3.815 -3.889 -3.893 -4.443 
 
[3.829] [3.820] [3.818] [3.824]    
DIVIDENDt 14.858*** 14.734*** 14.825*** 14.031*** 
 
[0.918] [0.943] [0.941] [0.937]    
dDIVIDENDt 1.153 1.27 1.174 1.155 
 
[1.404] [1.397] [1.395] [1.376]    
dDIVIDENDt+1 11.529*** 11.484*** 11.523*** 11.673*** 
 
[1.643] [1.640] [1.641] [1.662]    
dFIRM_VALUEt+1 0.210** 0.211** 0.210** 0.210**  
 
[0.106] [0.106] [0.106] [0.106]    
CONSTANT 0.899*** 0.730*** 0.869*** 0.785*** 
 [0.165] [0.167] [0.166] [0.162]    
Adjusted R-sq 0.315 0.313 0.315 0.315 




Panel B: 3SLS estimation 
FIRM_VALUE equation 
CASH RATIOt 0.727*** 0.232 -0.061 1.704*** 
 [0.190] [0.144] [0.207] [0.062]    
COUNTRY_GVSCOREt -0.06  0.045              
 [0.039]  [0.043]              
CASH RATIOt*COUNTRY_GVSCOREt 0.807***  0.332**              
 [0.139]  [0.148]              
FIRM_GVSCOREt -0.452*** -0.925*** -1.007*** -0.351*** 
 [0.076] [0.102] [0.119] [0.067]    
CASH RATIOt*FIRM_GVSCOREt 
 
3.050*** 2.808***              
 
 
[0.257] [0.287]              
CASH RATIOt*DIVIDENDt    1.673*** 
    [0.376]    
ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS -0.094*** -0.089*** -0.093*** -0.086*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]    
EARNINGSt 1.698*** 1.713*** 1.737*** 1.606*** 
 [0.142] [0.141] [0.143] [0.141]    
dEARNINGSt 0.1 0.074 0.083 0.07 
 [0.119] [0.119] [0.120] [0.119]    
dEARNINGSt+1 1.453*** 1.445*** 1.453*** 1.424*** 
 [0.114] [0.113] [0.114] [0.113]    
dNET_ASSETSt 0.678*** 0.614*** 0.664*** 0.690*** 
 [0.070] [0.070] [0.070] [0.070]    
dNET_ASSETSt+1 0.447*** 0.424*** 0.427*** 0.463*** 
 [0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.045]    
R&Dt 6.045*** 5.284*** 5.303*** 6.179*** 
 [0.379] [0.376] [0.378] [0.378]    
dR&Dt -6.363*** -5.289*** -5.416*** -6.232*** 
 [1.023] [1.022] [1.027] [1.023]    
dR&Dt+1 -3.547*** -4.015*** -4.010*** -3.525*** 
 [1.075] [1.072] [1.078] [1.073]    
INTERESTt 10.923*** 11.434*** 11.501*** 10.293*** 
 
[1.136] [1.119] [1.141] [1.123]    
dINTERESTt -12.390*** -13.011*** -12.809*** -12.132*** 
 
[1.769] [1.765] [1.775] [1.768]    
dINTERESTt+1 -2.581 -2.661* -2.54 -3.312**  
 
[1.617] [1.609] [1.620] [1.617]    
DIVIDENDt 14.926*** 15.420*** 15.406*** 14.229*** 
 
[0.447] [0.448] [0.451] [0.465]    
dDIVIDENDt 1.191 0.832 0.854 1.178 
 
[0.836] [0.834] [0.839] [0.835]    
dDIVIDENDt+1 11.716*** 11.626*** 11.666*** 11.818*** 
 
[0.726] [0.724] [0.727] [0.725]    
dFIRM_VALUEt+1 0.209*** 0.206*** 0.208*** 0.209*** 
 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]    
CONSTANT 1.201*** 1.312*** 1.329*** 1.090**  
 [0.466] [0.468] [0.468] [0.465]    
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Panel B of Table 6 continued 
FIRM_GVSCORE equation 
SIZEt 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]    
LEVERAGEt 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]    
CASH_FLOWt 0.236*** 0.209*** 0.218*** 0.240*** 
 
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]    
EXTERNAL_FINANCEt 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]    
FIRM_VALUEt 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.026*** 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]    
CLOSELY HELD SHARESt -0.460*** -0.462*** -0.462*** -0.460*** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]    
COUNTRY_GVSCOREt 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]    
CONSTANT 0.133 0.113 0.112 0.145*   
 [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.082]    
Observations 17263 17263 17263 17263 
This table reports the results from OLS estimation in Panel A and 3SLS estimation for simultaneous equation 
system in panel B to measure the value effects of cash holdings along with country (COUNTRY_GVSCORE) 
and firm level (FIRM_GVSCORE) governance scores. FIRM_VALUE is measured by the ratio of (book value 
of total assets + market value of common equity − book value of common equity) to book value of total assets. 
Country level governance is measured by the average of six World Bank Governance Indicators. The sample 
period is from 2002 to 2013. Definitions of all variables are given in Table 1. The symbols ***, **, * denote 





Appendix: Sample construction 
Number of firm/year observations by country based on availability of the firm level governance score 
 
 # of Observations # of Firms Total MarketCap. (milUS$) in 2013 
 Potential Final % Potential Final % Potential Final % 
Australia 8037 1130 14% 1244 257 21% 657,301 594,487 90% 
Austria 331 90 27% 57 13 23% 46,669 37,653 81% 
Belgium 490 115 23% 91 19 21% 259,567 244,481 94% 
Brazil 656 107 16% 192 44 23% 264,021 200,075 76% 
Canada 2739 411 15% 826 160 19% 956,764 757,917 79% 
Chile 759 51 7% 99 11 11% 120,604 56,041 46% 
China 5238 231 4% 1483 57 4% 1,540,045 129,031 8% 
Colombia 123 11 9% 20 3 15% 26,756 19,286 72% 
Denmark 695 154 22% 109 20 18% 75,260 57,382 76% 
Finland 881 204 23% 118 24 20% 142,686 123,070 86% 
France 3075 568 18% 541 78 14% 1,565,263 1,428,458 91% 
Germany 2866 469 16% 526 70 13% 815,920 694,257 85% 
Greece 392 53 14% 137 13 9% 46,485 16,589 36% 
Hong Kong 7370 427 6% 798 70 9% 960,867 754,458 79% 
Hungary 149 13 9% 26 3 12% 13,257 12,339 93% 
India 11054 217 2% 1835 56 3% 630,591 444,478 70% 
Indonesia 2300 76 3% 285 22 8% 195,585 117,969 60% 
Ireland 465 139 30% 67 17 25% 80,388 69,787 87% 
Israel 661 37 6% 118 11 9% 105,825 77,973 74% 
Italy 1178 186 16% 216 26 12% 275,221 203,517 74% 
Japan 13614 2192 16% 2111 322 15% 645,287 501,949 78% 
Korea, Rep. 5739 315 5% 962 75 8% 881,490 633,099 72% 
Luxembourg 73 27 37% 13 5 38% 55,151 28,431 52% 
Malaysia 6293 97 2% 872 26 3% 226,079 140,486 62% 
Mexico 272 37 14% 86 16 19% 205,436 162,066 79% 
Netherlands 882 218 25% 136 34 25% 234,371 213,875 91% 
New Zealand 406 42 10% 65 7 11% 27,687 12,122 44% 
Norway 372 60 16% 103 16 16% 201,487 165,060 82% 
Peru 190 7 4% 45 2 4% 21,310 1,133 5% 
Philippines 1056 25 2% 137 8 6% 86,538 47,565 55% 
Poland 507 28 6% 155 8 5% 54,343 17,623 32% 
Portugal 258 55 21% 41 8 20% 47,621 35,725 75% 
Russia 308 98 32% 74 27 36% 527,664 362,323 69% 
Singapore 4306 225 5% 549 30 5% 212,300 158,883 75% 
South Africa 1563 234 15% 232 89 38% 264,002 250,078 95% 
Spain 418 133 32% 101 30 30% 235,503 212,774 90% 
Sweden 1415 355 25% 222 42 19% 320,931 272,676 85% 
Switzerland 1295 383 30% 188 53 28% 583,488 543,156 93% 
Thailand 2880 58 2% 384 16 4% 201,597 99,049 49% 
Turkey 782 46 6% 154 13 8% 86,949 63,725 73% 
United Kingdom 12348 2217 18% 1983 287 14% 2,115,083 2,022,581 96% 
United States 42798 5962 14% 7357 826 11% 15,600,000 13,300,000 85% 
Total 147234 17503 12% 24758 2914 12% 31,613,390 25,283,629 80% 
 
